No material or high-risk concern was identified in this review.
This advisory report describes what the named tools and contextual reviewer found at one exact commit. Unknown or unobserved behavior may still exist.
0 high0 material4 low
What this review found
No material or high-risk item was identified.
Minor cautions
zizmor reported artipacked
Minor caution · medium confidence
The workflow leaves a GitHub token sitting in files on the build machine. Since the machine is temporary and no files are saved as artifacts, the practical risk is low, but it is better practice to avoid writing tokens to disk.
Technical evidence
Scanner reason: zizmor matched workflow-security rule artipacked in this repository.
Contextual assessment: The checkout step uses the default persist-credentials behavior, which leaves a token in the runner's git config. Additionally, a later step writes the GITHUB_TOKEN to a plaintext file in the working directory. No artifact upload steps exist, so the token file is not persisted beyond the ephemeral runner. The risk is limited to the standard artipacked concern of credential residue on a temporary CI runner.
Impact: low · Exploitability: unlikely
Developer action: Set persist-credentials: false on the checkout step and avoid writing the token to a plaintext file; pass it via environment variables instead.
The workflow uses a version label for a third-party action instead of locking it to a specific snapshot. If someone hijacked that label, they could run their code during releases.
Technical evidence
Scanner reason: zizmor matched workflow-security rule unpinned-uses in this repository.
Contextual assessment: The workflow references actions/create-release@v1 by tag rather than by a pinned commit SHA. A tag reference is mutable and could be retargeted by a compromise of the action repository, allowing arbitrary code execution in the release workflow context.
Impact: low · Exploitability: plausible
Developer action: Pin the action to a full commit SHA instead of a tag.
The workflow uses a version label for the checkout action instead of locking it to a specific snapshot. If that label were hijacked, malicious code could run during the build.
Technical evidence
Scanner reason: zizmor matched workflow-security rule unpinned-uses in this repository.
Contextual assessment: The workflow references actions/checkout@v2 by tag rather than by a pinned commit SHA. A tag is mutable and could be retargeted by a compromise of the actions repository, allowing arbitrary code execution in the workflow context.
Impact: low · Exploitability: plausible
Developer action: Pin the action to a full commit SHA instead of a tag.
The release action used here is no longer maintained. If a security problem is found in it, nobody will fix it.
Technical evidence
Scanner reason: zizmor matched workflow-security rule archived-uses in this repository.
Contextual assessment: The actions/create-release@v1 action is archived and no longer maintained. Using archived actions means no security patches will be issued if vulnerabilities are discovered. Combined with the unpinned reference, this increases supply-chain risk.
Impact: low · Exploitability: unlikely
Developer action: Replace the archived action with a maintained alternative, such as softprops/action-gh-release or the GitHub CLI, pinned to a commit SHA.