The flagged code loads the extension's own companion file from the same folder it was installed in, then runs it. This is a common module-loading technique in hobbyist SillyTavern extensions that lack a build step. The content being executed is a local bundled file, not user input or data from an external server, so there is no demonstrated security risk.
Technical evidence
Scanner reason: OpenGrep matched static-analysis rule tavernkeeper.dynamic-execution.javascript-eval. The match applies to this repository.
Contextual assessment: Line 39 uses `new Function(xhr.responseText)()` to execute the content of `lib/emotion-engine.js`, a companion module fetched via synchronous XHR from BASE_URL (the extension's own installation directory, derived from the script's own src attribute). The relativePath argument is a hardcoded string ('lib/emotion-engine.js'), not user-controlled. BASE_URL is resolved from the extension's own script tag origin and falls back to a same-origin local path. This is a module-loading pattern explicitly noted as borrowed from SillyTavern-EchoText. There is no demonstrated attacker-controlled input path into the evaluated string; the XHR target is the extension's own bundled file. The synchronous XHR is a deprecated API and a quality concern, but it does not constitute a security vulnerability in this context. No exfiltration, credential access, or concealed execution is present.